Aku Tahu Gerakan Jenderal Soeharto


Aku Tahu Gerakan Jenderal Soeharto

Menjadi seorang Presiden mungkin “tidak terlalu sulit,” tetapi menjadi seorang pemimpin negeri sangatlah tidak mudah. Meraih jabatan sebagai Presiden banyak ditopang oleh kematangan strategi politik, tetapi menjadi pemimpin sebuah negeri sangat membutuhkan kekuatan mental serta kesediaan sakit dan berkorban demi negeri serta rakyat yang dipimpinnya.

Konsep sebagai seorang pemimpin besar telah ditunjukkan secara nyata oleh Presiden Soekarno dalam menyikapi langkah-langkah kudeta Jenderal Soeharto dan kroninya.

TINDAKAN Soeharto menyelewengkan Surat Perintah 11 Maret 1966 sangat menyakiti perasaan Bung Karno. Sejumlah petinggi militer yang masih setia pada Sukarno ketika itu pun merasa geram. Mereka meminta agar Sukarno bertindak tegas dengan memukul Soeharto dan pasukannya. Tetapi Sukarno menolak.

Sukarno tak mau terjadi huru-hara, apalagi sampai melibatkan tentara. Perang saudara, menurut Sukarno, adalah hal yang ditunggu-tunggu pihak asing—kaum kolonial yang mengincar Indonesia–sejak lama. Begitu perang saudara meletus, pihak asing, terutama Amerika Serikat dan Inggris akan mengirimkan pasukan mereka ke Indonesia dengan alasan menyelamatkan fasilitas negara mereka, mulai dari para diplomat kedutaanbesar sampai perusahaan-perusahaan asing milik mereka.

Kesaksian mengenai keengganan Sukarno menggunakan cara-cara kekerasan dalam menghadapi manuver Soeharto disampaikan salah seorang menteri Kabinet Dwikora, Muhammad Achadi. Saya bertemu Achadi, mantan menteri transmigrasi dan rektor Universitas Bung Karno itu dua pekan lalu di Jalan Taman Amir Hamzah, Jakarta Pusat. Achadi bercerita dengan lancar kepada saya dan beberapa teman. Air putih dan pisang rebus menemani pembicaraan kami sore itu.

Komandan Korps Komando (KKO) Letjen Hartono termasuk salah seorang petinggi militer yang menyatakan siap menunggu perintah pukul dari Sukarno. KKO sejak lama memang dikenal sebagai barisan pendukung utama Soekarno. Kalimat Hartono: “hitam kata Bung Karno, hitam kata KKo” yang populer di masa-masa itu masih sering terdengar hingga kini.

Suatu hari di pertengahan Maret 1966, Hartono yang ketika itu menjabat sebagai Menteri/Wakil Panglima Angkatan Laut itu datang ke Istana Merdeka menemui Bung Karno. Ketika itu Achadi sedang memberikan laporan pada Sukarno tentang penahanan beberapa menteri yang dilakukan oleh pasukan yang loyal pada Soeharto.

Mendengar laporan itu, menurut Achadi, Bung Karno berkata (kira-kira), “Kemarin sore Harto datang ke sini. Dia minta izin melakukan pengawalan kepada para menteri yang menurut informasi akan didemo oleh mahasiswa.”

“Tetapi itu bukan pengawalan,” kata Achadi. Untuk membuktikan laporannya, Achadi memerintahkan ajudannya menghubungi menteri penerangan Achmadi. Seperti Achadi, Achmadi juga duduk di Tim Epilog yang bertugas menghentikan ekses buruk pascapembunuhan enam jenderal dan perwira muda Angkatan Darat dinihari 1 Oktober 1965. Soeharto juga berada di dalam tim itu.

Tetapi setelah beberapa kali dicoba, Achmadi tidak dapat dihubungi. Tidak jelas dimana keberadaannya.

Saat itulah Hartono minta izin untuk menghadapi Soeharto dan pasukannya. Tetapi Bung Karno menggelengkan kepala, melarang.

Padahal masih kata Achadi, selain KKO, Panglima Kodam Jaya Amir Machmud, Panglima Kodam Siliwangi Ibrahim Adji, dan beberapa panglima kodam lainnya juga bersedia menghadapi Soeharto.

“Bung Karno tetap menggelengkan kepala. Dia sama sekali tidak mau terjadi pertumpahan darah, dan perang saudara.”

Kalau begitu apa yang harus kami lakukan, tanya Achadi dan Hartono.

Bung Karno memerintahkan Hartono untuk menghalang-halangi upaya Soeharto agar jangan sampai berkembang lebih jauh. “Hanya itu tugasnya, Hartono diminta menjabarkan sendiri. Yang jelas jangan sampai ada perang saudara,” kata Achadi.

Menghindari perang saudara inilah sebagai wujud kecintaan Presiden Soekarno terhadap rakyat dan negeri ini. Pantang bagi Bung Karno meneteskan darah diatas negeri ini, apabila hanya akan ditukar dengan sebuah kekuasaan.

Salam Revolusi

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86 Komentar

  1. Itulah kebesaran hati seorang pemimpin masa lalu yg tidak bisa kita dapati di masa sekarang ini……Itu hanyalah bagian dari sejarah (cerita sejarah).Mungkinkah akan dibangkitkan kembali dalam kenyataan kepemimpinan masa ini….?

  2. letjen HARTONO nasibnya tragis dibuang ke pyong lalu “bunuh diri” memang sih kalo pada saat pasca GESTOK terjadi perang antar faksi bisa dipastikan kita akan senasib dengan YUGOSLAVIA di akhir 1996 pecah berkeping keping !!!!

  3. salut bwt bung karno??? blm ad org sprti bung karno d negeri ini?????

  4. Pengorbanan diri yang memberi kewenangan terhadap lawan politiknya untuk meneruskan strateginya menghancurkan cita-citanya. Padahal meski bagaimnpun waktu itu BK harus lebih waspada dan bertindak tegas pd situasi saat itu. Tp entahlah dibalik itu semua? (Wangsit SIliwangi : “Jangan melihat ke belakang”)

  5. kurang araj kw SOEHARTO.,.__
    Latnat kw.,.
    Soekarno “ikrank”
    is the best.,.

  6. kurang ajar kw SOEHARTO.,.__
    Latnat kw.,.
    Soekarno “ikrank”
    is the best.,.

  7. Salam hormat tulusku untukmu, Bung Karno !!!! Semoga kami bisa memahami, njat sucimu untuk bunda Pertiwi…. Dan Suharto, kuserahkan biar Yang Kuasa yang menghukumnya….dan itu memang hak Nya. Sebagai generasi penerusmu, Bung Karno kami merasa berhutang untuk melanjutkan amanahmu…..Semoga Tuhan YME, seantiasa memaafkan semua kesalahanmu, dan memuliakan akhir hidupmu. Aku selalu rindu padamu… Bung Karno, HORMAT dan CINTAKU…tak akan tergantikan oleh apapun dan siapapun.

  8. itulah bedanya, Bung Karno adalah negarawan..yg bersedia berkorban demi negaranya,kl harto mah politikus..liat aja politikus jaman skrg kelakuannya kyk apa..ya ngikutin gurunya ..siapa lg kl bkn suharto geblek itu…

  9. disebuah gubuk reot ada dua buah foto 1 foto soekarno yang udah kusam serta tidak berwarna namun berbingkai, terpasang ditengah dinding gubuk itu dan satunya foto suharto masih baru full color terpasang pada dinding sanping sebelah bawah . tanyaku pada penhuni rumah Mbah kenapa masang fotoya begitu beda jawabya soekarno pantas untuk ditiru dan karismatik yang gambar suhato ah buat tutup lubang aja

  10. salam perjuangan
    jasamu akan selalu ku kenang
    pahlawan sepertimu tidak mungkin kembali dalam dunia masa kini
    dan dirimu akan selalu menjadi contoh teladan buat generasi teladan anak negeri yang sekarang menghadapi kemelut negeri yng ber virus ini

  11. “sdh saatnya kita sebagai penerus melanjutkan dan meluruskan sejarah yg sebenarnya,dalam tidur tdk tenang karena melihat negeri ini mari kembali ke dasar palsafah kita PANCASILA DAN UUD 1945…”

  12. aku bangga soekarno pernah memimpin bangsa dan negara yg kita cintai ini……

  13. Bangsa ini sekarang dipimpin manusia product harto Pada Korup semua
    menyesatkan rakyat , Kalah dengan malaysia dan singapure.

    Kapan ada Bungkarno Hidup lagi Selamatkan bangsa ini dari manusia – manusia kerdil indonesia. kemiskinan dimana – mana rakyat bayar Pajak dikemplang.

  14. Bung..maaf tapi sepertinya ada artikel yang sedikit kurang berimbang dan sedikit plagiat layou bukan bermaksud mengadu, tapi dari segi tulisan agak sedikit tidak “berbobot” dan mendiskreditkan sekali silakan tengok thttp://soekarnofiles.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/soekarno-bukan-dewa/

  15. SAAT REVVOLUSI LAGI

  16. Sudah lama aku tidak membaca artikel tentang soekarno entah kenapa pd malam ini hatiku menggerakkan jemari tanganku untuk mencari artikel tentang soekarno,,ada kerinduan yg terpendam pada sosok soekarno. aku br mengenal sedikit tentang soekarno itupun dari warisan almarhum ayahku buku-buku soekarno (dia pengagum berat soekarno) sampai wafatnya…Pada malam ini aku bersemangat untuk membaca semua tentang soekarno..semoga malam ini menjadikan inspirasiku dalam menjalani hidup yang semakin berat, jujur….sampai saat ini figur soekarno belum tergantikan di negara kita..sampai dunia kiamatpun tidak akan pernah ada lagi..Yaa allah berikanlah soekarno tempat disisiMu yg paling mulia..Aminnn..yaa robballalamin…

  17. Luar biasa, rela mati demi cinta negeri!

  18. kita bukan Generasi penerus…..tapi generasi pelurus….pelurus sejarah yg selama in di isolasi, dengungkan wahai pemuda kita bukan negara kecil tapi negara yang besar,,besar dalam berakhlaq,nasionalis, dan besar jiwa kemanusiaan kita………
    hidup soekarno…..hidup pancasila dan garuda….hidup indonesia

  19. Setuju sekali brother Netro… kita generasi pelurus…

  20. [...] Aku Tahu Gerakan Jenderal Soeharto [...]

  21. KITA HARUS BANGKIT DARI TIDUR KEBODOHAN, KEBODOHAN MORAL DAN NASIONALISME GAYANG KORUPTOR

  22. JIKA PEMERINTAH TIDAK MAMPU MENGURUS NEGRERI INI SILAHKAN BUBARKAN DIRI KAMI AKAN BANGKIT UNTUK MENERUSKAN MASUK KEDALAM KEMERDEKAAN YANG SEJATI RAKYAT DAN BANGSA INI TELAH LAMA MEMBERI KESEMPATAN KEPADA PARA PECUNDANG JEONIS BANGSA SEHINGGA KITA BERHENTI PADA PINTU KEMERDEKAAN, MARI KITA MASUK PADA KEMERDEKAAN YANG SESUNGGUHNYA ” HIDUP BANGSA KU HIDUP RAKYATKU” MARI KEMBALI KEPADA UUD 1945 DAN PANCASILA YANG MURNI.

  23. Patut diperhatikan keunggulan dan kepahlawanan Bung Karno sbb:
    Walaupun sebagai insinyur pribumi pertama tamatan Technische Hogeschool Bandung sebetulnya Bung Karno bisa hidup enak dan terjamin, beliau lebih mementingkan nasib rakyat dan bangsa dan bergerak serta berjuang untuk kemerdekaan Indonesia dengan pengorbanan besar (penjara, buangan Digul, Flores, Bengkulu). Lain sekali dengan jendral yang menggeser Bung Karno dan kemudian menjadikan dirinya presiden kedua RI:
    Semasa Bung Karno dibelenggu pemerintahan Hindia Blanda karena beliau tak mau kerjasama dengan penjajah, si Suharto masuk tentara budak KNIL (Koningkelijke Nederlands Indische Leger) dan akhirnya menjadi budak CIA/Amrik untuk menggulingkan Bung Karno. Jadi peranan presiden RI pertama dan kedua itu berlawanan sekali: Bung Karno adalah pahlawan dan pendekar bangsa dan Suharto paling2 pahlawan keluarga besar Golkar dan kroninya. Bung Karno tak pernah memungkinkan pembantaian rakyatnya seperti Suharto dan kakitangannya (a.l. Sarwo Edi) yang 1965/66 ratusanribu lebih korbannya.
    BUNG KARNO ADALAH SATU2NYA PAHLAWAN NASIONAL INDONESIA!

  24. Pak Karno dan Pak Harto sama-sama pemimpin besar negara ini yang berani berinisiatif untuk mengambil tanggungjawab dan resiko sebagai pemimpin, beliau berdua pada akhir kekuasaanya sama-sama menghindari pertumpahan darah bagi rakyatnya…Ada hikmah keteladanaan yang baik dan kekurangan sebagai manusia pada masing-masing beliau yang perlu dijadikan pelajaran bagi pemimpin Negara ini sekarang dan di masa depan

  25. @Uce sorry pal u sound very suharto apologist..good role model u say? c’mon gimme a break suharto tought all of us how to corrupt,abuse of power,medias blackout,human rights violation in massive scale,military dictatorship and historical distortions…no way jose i can buy this shit…read and learn! :(

  26. penggulingan Bung Karno memang merupakan skenario besar yang
    telah diputuskan oleh pihak Nekolim (Neo Kolonialisme dan imperialisme) yang menganggap Presiden Soekarno dengan kekuatan dunia ketiganya yang mencakup bangsa-bangsa Asia, Afrika dan Amerika Latin yang tergabung dalam gerakan the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) sebagai kekuatan baru dunia yang akan mengganggu
    eksistensi kekuatan Nekolim. Hal ini sesungguhnya telah diungkapkan oleh Presiden Soekamo dalam pidatonya pada tanggal 28 Mei 1965 di depan pertemuan dengan para Pangdam se-Indonesia, dimana pada acara tersebut Presiden Soekamo yang didampingi
    oleh Letnan Jenderal Achmad Yani mengungkapkan bahwa berdasarkan data Intelejen yang disampaikan sendiri oleh Letnan Jenderal Achmad Yani; diketahui konspirasi.intemasional Nekolim telah menetapakan Revolusi Indonesia sebagai “Enemy Number 1″
    dan untuk menghancurkannya, maka Yani, Soebandrio dan Soekamo harus dilenyapkan.Dari situlah dapat dipahami bahwa sesungguhnya peristiwa 1965-1967 merupakan upaya penggulingan Bung Karno dari kekuasaannya yang dilakukan oleh konspirasi kekuatan internasional (lihaynya subversi Nekolim), dibantu oleh beberapa tokoh nasional yang berambisi menggantikan Bung Karno (oknum-oknum yang “tidak bener”)
    dan kemudian secara operasional dipicu oleh keblingeran pimpinan PKI. Upaya penggulingan Bung Karno tersebut pada kenyataannya dilakukan melalui langkah2:
    1. Pembunuhan terhadap jenderal-jenderal pendukung Bung Karno (Letjen Achmad Yani, dan kawan-kawan).
    2. Hancurkan kekuatan politik terbesar pendukung Bung Karno (PKI dan ormasormasnya,Partindo, dll).
    3. Pisahkan Bung Karno dari penngikut dan para pendukungnya (Penangkapan terhadap para Menteri Kabinet Dwikora, termasuk Soebandrio; para anggota MPRS, para anggota DPR-GR, DPA dan Front Nasional).
    4. Dan akhirnya gulingkan Presiden Soekarno (penolakan Nawaksara dan pelengkap Nawaksara yang dilanjutkan dengan penerbitan Tap MPRS, No.XXXIII/1967 tentang pemberhentian Bung Kamo sebagai Presiden)

  27. Uraian tsb. cocok sekali dengan hasil reset Peter Dale Scott sbb:
    This article is from Pacific Affairs, 58, Summer 1985, pages 239-264. Peter Dale Scott is a professor of English at the University of California in Berkeley, and a member of the advisory board at Public Information Research.

    The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967
    Peter Dale Scott

    In this short paper on a huge and vexed subject, I discuss the U.S. involvement in the bloody overthrow of Indonesia’s President Sukarno, 1965-67. The whole story of that ill-understood period would transcend even the fullest possible written analysis. Much of what happened can never be documented; and of the documentation that survives, much is both controversial and unverifiable. The slaughter of Sukarno’s left-wing allies was a product of widespread paranoia as well as of conspiratorial policy, and represents a tragedy beyond the intentions of any single group or coalition. Nor is it suggested that in 1965 the only provocations and violence came from the right-wing Indonesian military, their contacts in the United States, or (also important, but barely touched on here) their mutual contacts in British, German and Japanese intelligence.
    And yet, after all this has been said, the complex and ambiguous story of the Indonesian bloodbath is also in essence simpler and easier to believe than the public version inspired by President Suharto and U.S. government sources. Their problematic claim is that in the so-called Gestapu (Gerakan September Tigahpuluh) coup attempt of September 30, 1965 (when six senior army generals were murdered), the left attacked the right, leading to a restoration of power, and punitive purge of the left, by the center.1 This article argues instead that, by inducing, or at a minimum helping to induce, the Gestapu “coup,” the right in the Indonesian Army eliminated its rivals at the army’s center, thus paving the way to a long-planned elimination of the civilian left, and eventually to the establishment of a military dictatorship.2 Gestapu, in other words, was only the first phase of a three-phase right-wing coup — one which had been both publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials.3
    Before turning to U.S. involvement in what the CIA itself has called “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century,”4 let us recall what actually led up to it. According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch, by 1965 the Indonesian Army General Staff was split into two camps. At the center were the general staff officers appointed with, and loyal to, the army commander General Yani, who in turn was reluctant to challenge President Sukarno’s policy of national unity in alliance with the Indonesian Communist party, or PKI. The second group, including the right-wing generals Nasution and Suharto, comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist policies.5 All of these generals were anti-PKI, but by 1965 the divisive issue was Sukarno.
    The simple (yet untold) story of Sukarno’s overthrow is that in the fall of 1965 Yani and his inner circle of generals were murdered, paving the way for a seizure of power by right-wing anti-Yani forces allied to Suharto. The key to this was the so-called Gestapu coup attempt which, in the name of supporting Sukarno, in fact targeted very precisely the leading members of the army’s most loyal faction, the Yani group.6 An army unity meeting in January 1965, between “Yani’s inner circle” and those (including Suharto) who “had grievances of one sort or another against Yani,” lined up the victims of September 30 against those who came to power after their murder.7
    Not one anti-Sukarno general was targeted by Gestapu, with the obvious exception of General Nasution.8 But by 1961 the CIA operatives had become disillusioned with Nasution as a reliable asset, because of his “consistent record of yielding to Sukarno on several major counts.”9 Relations between Suharto and Nasution were also cool, since Nasution, after investigating Suharto on corruption charges in 1959, had transferred him from his command.10
    The duplicitous distortions of reality, first by Lt. Colonel Untung’s statements for Gestapu, and then by Suharto in “putting down” Gestapu, are mutually supporting lies.11 Untung, on October 1, announced ambiguously that Sukarno was under Gestapu’s “protection” (he was not); also, that a CIA-backed Council of Generals had planned a coup for before October 5, and had for this purpose brought “troops from East, Central, and West Java” to Jakarta.12 Troops from these areas had indeed been brought to Jakarta for an Armed Forces Day parade on October 5th. Untung did not mention, however, that “he himself had been involved in the planning for the Armed Forces Day parade and in selecting the units to participate in it;”13 nor that these units (which included his own former battalion, the 454th) supplied most of the allies for his new battalion’s Gestapu activities in Jakarta.
    Suharto’s first two broadcasts reaffirmed the army’s constant loyalty to “Bung Karno the Great Leader,” and also blamed the deaths of six generals on PKI youth and women, plus “elements of the Air Force” — on no other evidence than the site of the well where the corpses were found.14 At this time he knew very well that the killings had in fact been carried out by the very army elements Untung referred to, elements under Suharto’s own command.15
    Thus, whatever the motivation of individuals such as Untung in the Gestapu putsch, Gestapu as such was duplicitous. Both its rhetoric and above all its actions were not simply inept; they were carefully designed to prepare for Suharto’s equally duplicitous response. For example, Gestapu’s decision to guard all sides of the downtown Merdeka Square in Jakarta, except that on which Suharto’s KOSTRAD [Army Strategic Reserve Command] headquarters were situated, is consistent with Gestapu’s decision to target the only army generals who might have challenged Suharto’s assumption of power. Again, Gestapu’s announced transfer of power to a totally fictitious “Revolutionary Council,” from which Sukarno had been excluded, allowed Suharto in turn to masquerade as Sukarno’s defender while in fact preventing him from resuming control. More importantly, Gestapu’s gratuitous murder of the generals near the air force base where PKI youth had been trained allowed Suharto, in a Goebbels-like manoeuvre, to transfer the blame for the killings from the troops under his own command (whom he knew had carried out the kidnappings) to air force and PKI personnel who where ignorant of them.16
    From the pro-Suharto sources — notably the CIA study of Gestapu published in 1968 — we learn how few troops were involved in the alleged Gestapu rebellion, and, more importantly, that in Jakarta as in Central Java the same battalions that supplied the “rebellious” companies were also used to “put the rebellion down.” Two thirds of one paratroop brigade (which Suharto had inspected the previous day) plus one company and one platoon constituted the whole of Gestapu forces in Jakarta; all but one of these units were commanded by present or former Diponegoro Division officers close to Suharto; and the last was under an officer who obeyed Suharto’s close political ally, Basuki Rachmat.17
    Two of these companies, from the 454th and 530th battalions, were elite raiders, and from 1962 these units had been among the main Indonesian recipients of U.S. assistance.18 This fact, which in itself proves nothing, increases our curiosity about the many Gestapu leaders who had been U.S.-trained. The Gestapu leader in Central Java, Saherman, had returned from training at Fort Leavenworth and Okinawa, shortly before meeting with Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th Battalion in mid-August 1965.19 As Ruth McVey has observed, Saherman’s acceptance for training at Fort Leavenworth “would mean that he had passed review by CIA observers.”20
    Thus there is continuity between the achievements of both Gestapu and the response to it by Suharto, who in the name of defending Sukarno and attacking Gestapu continued its task of eliminating the pro-Yani members of the Army General Staff, along with such other residual elements of support for first Yani and then Sukarno as remained.21
    The biggest part of this task was of course the elimination of the PKI and its supporters, in a bloodbath which, as some Suharto allies now concede, may have taken more than a half-million lives. These three events — Gestapu, Suharto’s response, and the bloodbath — have nearly always been presented in this country as separately motivated: Gestapu being described as a plot by leftists, and the bloodbath as for the most part an irrational act of popular frenzy.
    U.S. officials, journalists and scholars, some with rather prominent CIA connections, are perhaps principally responsible for the myth that the bloodbath was a spontaneous, popular revulsion to what U.S. Ambassador Jones later called PKI “carnage.”22 Although the PKI certainly contributed its share to the political hysteria of 1965, Crouch has shown that subsequent claims of a PKI terror campaign were grossly exaggerated.23 In fact systematic killing occurred under army instigation in staggered stages, the worst occurring as Colonel Sarwo Edhie’s RPKAD [Army Paracommando Regiment] moved from Jakarta to Central and East Java, and finally to Bali.24 Civilians involved in the massacre were either recruited and trained by the army on the spot, or were drawn from groups (such as the army- and CIA-sponsored SOKSI trade unions [Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees], and allied student organizations) which had collaborated for years with the army on political matters. It is clear from Sundhaussen’s account that in most of the first areas of organized massacre (North Sumatra, Aceh, Cirebon, the whole of Central and East Java), there were local army commanders with especially strong and proven anti-PKI sentiments. Many of these had for years cooperated with civilians, through so-called “civic action” programs sponsored by the United States, in operations directed against the PKI and sometimes Sukarno. Thus one can legitimately suspect conspiracy in the fact that anti-PKI “civilian responses” began on October 1, when the army began handing out arms to Muslim students and unionists, before there was any publicly available evidence linking Gestapu to the PKI.25
    Even Sundhaussen, who downplays the army’s role in arming and inciting the civilian murder bands, concludes that, whatever the strength of popular anti-PKI hatred and fear, “without the Army’s anti-PKI propaganda the massacre might not have happened.”26 The present article goes further and argues that Gestapu, Suharto’s response, and the bloodbath were part of a single coherent scenario for a military takeover, a scenario which was again followed closely in Chile in the years 1970-73 (and to some extent in Cambodia in 1970).
    Suharto, of course, would be a principal conspirator in this scenario: his duplicitous role of posing as a defender of the constitutional status quo, while in fact moving deliberately to overthrow it, is analogous to that of General Pinochet in Chile. But a more direct role in organizing the bloodbath was played by civilians and officers close to the cadres of the CIA’s failed rebellion of 1958, now working in so-called “civic action” programs funded and trained by the United States. Necessary ingredients of the scenario had to be, and clearly were, supplied by other nations in support of Suharto. Many such countries appear to have played such a supporting role: Japan, Britain, Germany,27 possibly Australia. But I wish to focus on the encouragement and support for military “putschism” and mass murder which came from the U.S., from the CIA, the military, RAND, the Ford Foundation, and individuals.28
    The United States and the Indonesian Army’s “Mission”
    It seems clear that from as early as 1953 the U.S. was interested in helping to foment the regional crisis in Indonesia, usually recognized as the “immediate cause” that induced Sukarno, on March 14, 1957, to proclaim martial law, and bring “the officer corps legitimately into politics.”29
    By 1953 (if not earlier) the U.S. National Security Council had already adopted one of a series of policy documents calling for “appropriate action, in collaboration with other friendly countries, to prevent permanent communist control” of Indonesia.30 Already NSC 171/1 of that year envisaged military training as a means of increasing U.S. influence, even though the CIA’s primary efforts were directed towards right-wing political parties (“moderates … on the right,” as NSC 171 called them): notably the Masjumi Muslim and the PSI “Socialist” parties. The millions of dollars which the CIA poured into the Masjumi and the PSI in the mid-1950s were a factor influencing the events of 1965, when a former PSI member — Sjam — was the alleged mastermind of Gestapu,31 and PSI-leaning officers — notably Suwarto and Sarwo Edhie — were prominent in planning and carrying out the anti-PKI response to Gestapu.32
    In 1957-58, the CIA infiltrated arms and personnel in support of the regional rebellions against Sukarno. These operations were nominally covert, even though an American plane and pilot were captured, and the CIA efforts were accompanied by an offshore task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.33 In 1975 a Senate Select Committee studying the CIA discovered what it called “some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno”; but, after an initial investigation of the November 1957 assassination attempt in the Cikini district of Jakarta, the committee did not pursue the matter.34
    On August 1, 1958, after the failure of the CIA-sponsored PRRI-Permesta regional rebellions against Sukarno, the U.S. began an upgraded military assistance program to Indonesia in the order of twenty million dollars a year.35 A U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memo of 1958 makes it clear this aid was given to the Indonesian Army (“the only non-Communist force … with the capability of obstructing the … PKI”) as “encouragement” to Nasution to “carry out his ‘plan’ for the control of Communism.”36
    The JCS had no need to spell out Nasution’s “plan,” to which other documents at this time made reference.37 It could only imply the tactics for which Nasution had distinguished himself (in American eyes) during the crushing of the PKI in the Madiun Affair of 1948: mass murders and mass arrests, at a minimum of the party’s cadres, possibly after an army provocation.38 Nasution confirmed this in November 1965, after the Gestapu slaughter, when he called for the total extinction of the PKI, “down to its very roots so there will be no third Madiun.”39
    By 1958, however, the PKI had emerged as the largest mass movement in the country. It is in this period that a small group of U.S. academic researchers in U.S. Air Force- and CIA-subsidized “think-tanks” began pressuring their contacts in the Indonesian military publicly, often through U.S. scholarly journals and presses, to seize power and liquidate the PKI opposition.40 The most prominent example is Guy Pauker, who in 1958 both taught at the University of California at Berkeley and served as a consultant at the RAND Corporation. In the latter capacity he maintained frequent contact with what he himself called “a very small group” of PSI intellectuals and their friends in the army.41
    In a RAND Corporation book published by the Princeton University Press, Pauker urged his contacts in the Indonesian military to assume “full responsibility” for their nation’s leadership, “fulfill a mission,” and hence “to strike, sweep their house clean.”42 Although Pauker may not have intended anything like the scale of bloodbath which eventually ensued, there is no escaping the fact that “mission” and “sweep clean” were buzz-words for counterinsurgency and massacre, and as such were used frequently before and during the coup. The first murder order, by military officers to Muslim students in early october, was the word sikat, meaning “sweep,” “clean out,” “wipe out,” or “massacre.”43
    Pauker’s closest friend in the Indonesian army was a U.S.-trained General Suwarto, who played an important part in the conversion of the army from a revolutionary to a counterinsurgency function. In the years after 1958, Suwarto built the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) into a training-ground for the takeover of political power. SESKOAD in this period became a focal-point of attention from the Pentagon, the CIA, RAND, and (indirectly) the Ford Foundation.44
    Under the guidance of Nasution and Suwarto, SESKOAD developed a new strategic doctrine, that of Territorial Warfare (in a document translated into English by Pauker), which gave priority to counterinsurgency as the army’s role. Especially after 1962, when the Kennedy administration aided the Indonesian Army in developing Civic Mission or “civic action” programs, this meant the organization of its own political infrastructure, or “Territorial Organization,” reaching in some cases down to the village level.45 As the result of an official U.S. State Department recommendation in 1962, which Pauker helped write, a special U.S. MILTAG (Military Training Advisory Group) was set up in Jakarta, to assist in the implementation of SESKOAD’s Civic Mission programs.46
    SESKOAD also trained the army officers in economics and administration, and thus to operate virtually as a para-state, independent of Sukarno’s government. So the army began to collaborate, and even sign contracts, with U.S. and other foreign corporations in areas which were now under its control. This training program was entrusted to officers and civilians close to the PSI.47 U.S. officials have confirmed that the civilians, who themselves were in a training program funded by the Ford Foundation, became involved in what the (then) U.S. military attache called “contingency planning” to prevent a PKI takeover.48
    But the most significant focus of U.S. training and aid was the Territorial Organization’s increasing liaison with “the civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organizations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels.”49 These political liaisons with civilian groups provided the structure for the ruthless suppression of the PKI in 1965, including the bloodbath.50
    Soon these army and civilian cadres were together plotting disruptive activities, such as the Bandung anti-Chinese riots of May 1963, which embarrassed not just the PKI, but Sukarno himself. Chomsky and Herman report that “Army-inspired anti-Chinese programs that took place in West Java in 1959 were financed by U.S. contributions to the local army commander”; apparently CIA funds were used by the commander (Colonel Kosasih) to pay local thugs in what Mozingo calls “the army’s (and probably the Americans’) campaign to rupture relations with China.”51 The 1963 riot, which took place in the very shadow of SESKOAD, is linked by Sundhaussen to an army “civic action” organization; and shows conspiratorial contact between elements (an underground PSI cell, PSI- and Masjumi-affiliated student groups, and General Ishak Djuarsa of the Siliwangi Division’s “civic action” organization) that would all be prominent in the very first phase of Suharto’s so-called “response” to the Gestapu.52 The May 1963 student riots were repeated in October 1965 and (especially in Bandung) January 1966, at which time the liaison between students and the army was largely in the hands of PSI-leaning officers like Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris.53 The CIA Plans Directorate was sympathetic to the increasing deflection of a nominally anti-PKI operation into one embarrassing Sukarno. This turn would have come as no surprise: Suwarto, Kemal Idris and the PSI had been prominent in a near-coup (the so-called “Lubis affair”) in 1956.54
    But increasingly Suwarto cultivated a new student, Colonel Suharto, who arrived at SESKOAD in October 1959. According to Sundhaussen, a relatively pro-Suharto scholar: “In the early 1960s Soeharto was involved in the formation of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and the Army’s policy on Civic Mission (that is, penetration of army officers into all fields of government activities and responsibilities).55 Central to the public image of Gestapu and Suharto’s response is the much-publicized fact that Suharto, unlike his sometime teacher Suwarto, and his long-time chief of staff Achmad Wiranatakusuma, had never studied in the United States. But his involvement in Civic Mission (or what Americans called “civic action”) programs located him along with PSI-leaning officers at the focal point of U.S. training activities in Indonesia, in a program which was nakedly political.56
    The refinement of Territorial Warfare and Civic Mission Doctrine into a new strategic doctrine for army political intervention became by 1965 the ideological process consolidating the army for political takeover. After Gestapu, when Suwarto was an important political advisor to his former SESKOAD pupil Suharto, his strategic doctrine was the justification for Suharto’s announcement on August 15, 1966, in fulfillment of Pauker’s public and private urgings, that the army had to assume a leading role in all fields.57
    Hence the army unity meeting of January 1965, arranged after Suharto had duplicitously urged Nasution to take “a more accommodating line”58 towards Sukarno, was in fact a necessary step in the process whereby Suharto effectively took over from his rivals Yani and Nasution. It led to the April 1965 seminar at SESKOAD for a compromise army strategic doctrine, the Tri Ubaya Cakti, which “reaffirmed the army’s claim to an independent political role.”59 On August 15, 1966, Suharto, speaking to the nation, justified his increasing prominence in terms of the “Revolutionary Mission” of the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine. Two weeks later at SESKOAD the doctrine was revised, at Suharto’s instigation but in a setting “carefully orchestrated by Brigadier Suwarto,” to embody still more clearly Pauker’s emphasis on the army’s “Civic Mission” or counterrevolutionary role.60 This “Civic Mission,” so important to Suharto, was also the principal goal and fruit of U.S. military aid to Indonesia.
    By August 1964, moreover, Suharto had initiated political contacts with Malaysia, and hence eventually with Japan, Britain, and the United States.61 Although the initial purpose of these contacts may have been to head off war with Malaysia, Sundhaussen suggests that Suharto’s motive was his concern, buttressed in mid-1964 by a KOSTRAD intelligence report, about PKI political advances.62 Mrazek links the peace feelers to the withdrawal of “some of the best army units” back to Java in the summer of 1965.63 These movements, together with earlier deployment of a politically insecure Diponegoro battalion in the other direction, can also be seen as preparations for the seizure of power.64
    In Nishihara’s informed Japanese account, former PRRI / Permesta personnel with intelligence connections in Japan were prominent in these negotiations, along with Japanese officials.65 Nishihara also heard that an intimate ally of these personnel, Jan Walandouw, who may have acted as a CIA contact for the 1958 rebellion, later again “visited Washington and advocated Suharto as a leader.”66 I am reliably informed that Walandouw’s visit to Washington on behalf of Suharto was made some months before Gestapu.67
    The U.S. Moves Against Sukarno
    Many people in Washington, especially in the CIA Plans Directorate, had long desired the “removal” of Sukarno as well as of the PKI.68 By 1961 key policy hard-liners, notably Guy Pauker, had also turned against Nasution.69 Nevertheless, despite last-minute memoranda from the outgoing Eisenhower administration which would have opposed “whatever regime” in Indonesia was “increasingly friendly toward the Sino-Soviet bloc,” the Kennedy administration stepped up aid to both Sukarno and the army.70
    However, Lyndon Johnson’s accession to the presidency was followed almost immediately by a shift to a more anti-Sukarno policy. This is clear from Johnson’s decision in December 1963 to withhold economic aid which (according to Ambassador Jones) Kennedy would have supplied “almost as a matter of routine.”71 This refusal suggests that the U.S. aggravation of Indonesia’s economic woes in 1963-65 was a matter of policy rather than inadvertence. Indeed, if the CIA’s overthrow of Allende is a relevant analogy, then one would expect someday to learn that the CIA, through currency speculations and other hostile acts, contributed actively to the radical destabilization of the Indonesian economy in the weeks just before the coup, when “the price of rice quadrupled between June 30 and October 1, and the black market price of the dollar skyrocketed, particularly in September.”72
    As was the case in Chile, the gradual cutoff of all economic aid to Indonesia in the years 1962-65 was accompanied by a shift in military aid to friendly elements in the Indonesian Army: U.S. military aid amounted to $39.5 million in the four years 1962-65 (with a peak of $16.3 million in 1962) as opposed to $28.3 million for the thirteen years 1949-61.73 After March 1964, when Sukarno told the U.S., “go to hell with your aid,” it became increasingly difficult to extract any aid from the U.S. congress: those persons not aware of what was developing found it hard to understand why the U.S. should help arm a country which was nationalizing U.S. economic interests, and using immense aid subsidies from the Soviet Union to confront the British in Malaysia.
    Thus a public image was created that under Johnson “all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped,” a claim so buttressed by misleading documentation that competent scholars have repeated it.74 In fact, Congress had agreed to treat U.S. funding of the Indonesian military (unlike aid to any other country) as a covert matter, restricting congressional review of the president’s determinations on Indonesian aid to two Senate committees, and the House Speaker, who were concurrently involved in oversight of the CIA.75
    Ambassador Jones’ more candid account admits that “suspension” meant “the U.S. government undertook no new commitments of assistance, although it continued with ongoing programs…. By maintaining our modest assistance to [the Indonesian Army and the police brigade], we fortified them for a virtually inevitable showdown with the burgeoning PKI.”76
    Only from recently released documents do we learn that new military aid was en route as late as July 1965, in the form of a secret contract to deliver two hundred Aero-Commanders to the Indonesian Army: these were light aircraft suitable for use in “civic action” or counterinsurgency operations, presumably by the Army Flying Corps whose senior officers were virtually all trained in the U.S.77 By this time, the publicly admitted U.S. aid was virtually limited to the completion of an army communications system and to “civic action” training. It was by using the army’s new communications system, rather than the civilian system in the hands of Sukarno loyalists, that Suharto on October 1, 1965 was able to implement his swift purge of Sukarno-Yani loyalists and leftists, while “civic action” officers formed the hard core of lower-level Gestapu officers in Central Java.78
    Before turning to the more covert aspects of U.S. military aid to Indonesia in 1963-65, let us review the overall changes in U.S.-Indonesian relations. Economic aid was now in abeyance, and military aid tightly channeled so as to strengthen the army domestically. U.S. government funding had obviously shifted from the Indonesian state to one of its least loyal components. As a result of agreements beginning with martial law in 1957, but accelerated by the U.S.-negotiated oil agreement of 1963, we see exactly the same shift in the flow of payments from U.S. oil companies. Instead of token royalties to the Sukarno government, the two big U.S. oil companies in Indonesia, Stanvac and Caltex, now made much larger payments to the army’s oil company, Permina, headed by an eventual political ally of Suharto, General Ibnu Sutowo; and to a second company, Pertamin, headed by the anti-PKI and pro-U.S. politician, Chaerul Saleh.79 After Suharto’s overthrow of Sukarno, Fortune wrote that “Sutowo’s still small company played a key part in bankrolling those crucial operations, and the army has never forgotten it.”80
    U.S. Support for the Suharto Faction Before Gestapu
    American officials commenting on the role of U.S. aid in this period have taken credit for assisting the anti-Communist seizure of power, without ever hinting at any degree of conspiratorial responsibility in the planning of the bloodbath. The impression created is that U.S. officials remained aloof from the actual planning of events, and we can see from recently declassified cable traffic how carefully the U.S. government fostered this image of detachment from what was happening in Indonesia.81
    In fact, however, the U.S. government was lying about its involvement. In Fiscal Year 1965, a period when The New York Times claimed “all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped,” the number of MAP (Military Assistance Program) personnel in Jakarta actually increased, beyond what had been projected, to an unprecedented high.82 According to figures released in 1966,83 from FY 1963 to FY 1965 the value of MAP deliveries fell from about fourteen million dollars to just over two million dollars. Despite this decline, the number of MAP military personnel remained almost unchanged, approximately thirty, while in FY 1965 civilian personnel (fifteen) were present for the first time. Whether or not one doubts that aid deliveries fell off as sharply as the figures would suggest, the MILTAG personnel figures indicate that their “civic action” program was being escalated, not decreased.84 We have seen that some months before Gestapu, a Suharto emissary with past CIA connections (Colonel Jan Walandouw) made contact with the U.S. government. From as early as May 1965, U.S. military suppliers with CIA connections (principally Lockheed) were negotiating equipment sales with payoffs to middlemen, in such a way as to generate payoffs to backers of the hitherto little-known leader of a new third faction in the army, Major-General Suharto — rather than to those backing Nasution or Yani, the titular leaders of the armed forces. Only in the last year has it been confirmed that secret funds administered by the U.S. Air Force (possibly on behalf of the CIA) were laundered as “commissions” on sales of Lockheed equipment and services, in order to make political payoffs to the military personnel of foreign countries.85
    A 1976 Senate investigation into these payoffs revealed, almost inadvertently, that in May 1965, over the legal objections of Lockheed’s counsel, Lockheed commissions in Indonesia had been redirected to a new contract and company set up by the firm’s long-time local agent or middleman.86 Its internal memos at the time show no reasons for the change, but in a later memo the economic counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is reported as saying that there were “some political considerations behind it.”87 If this is true, it would suggest that in May 1965, five months before the coup, Lockheed had redirected its payoffs to a new political eminence, at the risk (as its assistant chief counsel pointed out) of being sued for default on its former contractual obligations.
    The Indonesian middleman, August Munir Dasaad, was “known to have assisted Sukarno financially since the 1930’s.”88 In 1965, however, Dasaad was building connections with the Suharto forces, via a family relative, General Alamsjah, who had served briefly under Suharto in 1960, after Suharto completed his term at SESKOAD. Via the new contract, Lockheed, Dasaad and Alamsjah were apparently hitching their wagons to Suharto’s rising star:
    When the coup was made during which Suharto replaced Sukarno, Alamsjah, who controlled certain considerable funds, at once made these available to Suharto, which obviously earned him the gratitude of the new President. In due course he was appointed to a position of trust and confidence and today Alamsjah is, one might say, the second important man after the President.89
    Thus in 1966 the U.S. Embassy advised Lockheed it should “continue to use” the Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto connection.90
    In July 1965, at the alleged nadir of U.S.-Indonesian aid relations, Rockwell-Standard had a contractual agreement to deliver two hundred light aircraft (Aero-Commanders) to the Indonesian Army (not the Air Force) in the next two months.91 Once again the commission agent on the deal, Bob Hasan, was a political associate (and eventual business partner) of Suharto.92 More specifically, Suharto and Bob Hasan established two shipping companies to be operated by the Central Java army division, Diponegoro. This division, as has long been noticed, supplied the bulk of the personnel on both sides of the Gestapu coup drama — both those staging the coup attempt, and those putting it down. And one of the three leaders in the Central Java Gestapu movement was Lt. Col. Usman Sastrodibroto, chief of the Diponegoro Division’s “section dealing with extramilitary functions.”93
    Thus of the two known U.S. military sales contracts from the eve of the Gestapu Putsch, both involved political payoffs to persons who emerged after Gestapu as close Suharto allies. The use of this traditional channel for CIA patronage suggests that the U.S. was not at arm’s length from the ugly political developments of 1965, despite the public indications, from both government spokesmen and the U.S. business press, that Indonesia was now virtually lost to communism and nothing could be done about it.
    The actions of some U.S. corporations, moreover, made it clear that by early 1965 they expected a significant boost to the U.S. standing in Indonesia. For example, a recently declassified cable reveals that Freeport Sulphur had by April 1965 reached a preliminary “arrangement” with Indonesian officials for what would become a $500 million investment in West Papua copper. This gives the lie to the public claim that the company did not initiate negotiations with Indonesians (the inevitable Ibnu Sutowo) until February 1966.94 And in September 1965, shortly after World Oil reported that “indonesia’s gas and oil industry appeared to be slipping deeper into the political morass,”95 the president of a small oil company (Asamera) in a joint venture with Ibnu Sutowo’s Permina purchased $50,000 worth of shares in his own ostensibly-threatened company. Ironically this double purchase (on September 9 and September 21) was reported in the Wall Street Journal of September 30, 1965, the day of Gestapu.
    The CIA’s “[One Word Deleted] Operation” in 1965
    Less than a year after Gestapu and the bloodbath, James Reston wrote appreciatively about them as “A Gleam of Light in Asia”:
    Washington is being careful not to claim any credit for this change in the sixth most populous and one of the richest nations in the world, but this does not mean that Washington had nothing to do with it. There was a great deal more contact between the anti-Communist forces in that country and at least one very high official in Washington before and during the Indonesian massacre than is generally realized.96
    As for the CIA in 1965, we have the testimony of former CIA officer Ralph McGehee, curiously corroborated by the selective censorship of his former CIA employers:
    Where the necessary circumstances or proofs are lacking to support U.S. intervention, the C.I.A. creates the appropriate situations or else invents them and disseminates its distortions worldwide via its media operations.
    A prominent example would be Chile…. Disturbed at the Chilean military’s unwillingness to take action against Allende, the C.I.A. forged a document purporting to reveal a leftist plot to murder Chilean military leaders. The discovery of this “plot” was headlined in the media and Allende was deposed and murdered.
    There is a similarity between events that precipitated the overthrow of Allende and what happened in Indonesia in 1965. Estimates of the number of deaths that occurred as a result of the latter C.I.A. [one word deleted] operation run from one-half million to more than one million people.97
    McGehee claims to have once seen, while reviewing CIA documents in Washington, a highly classified report on the agency’s role in provoking the destruction of the PKI after Gestapu. It seems appropriate to ask for congressional review and publication of any such report. If, as is alleged, it recommended such murderous techniques as a model for future operations, it would appear to document a major turning-point in the agency’s operation history: towards the systematic exploitation of the death squad operations which, absent during the Brazilian coup of 1964, made the Vietnam Phoenix counterinsurgency program notorious after 1967, and after 1968 spread from Guatemala to the rest of Latin America.98
    McGehee’s claims of a CIA psychological warfare operation against Allende are corroborated by Tad Szulc:
    CIA agents in Santiago assisted Chilean military intelligence in drafting bogus Z-plan documents alleging that Allende and his supporters were planning to behead Chilean military commanders. These were issued by the junta to justify the coup.99
    Indeed the CIA deception operations against Allende appear to have gone even farther, terrifying both the left and the right with the fear of incipient slaughter by their enemies. Thus militant trade-unionists as well as conservative generals in Chile received small cards printed with the ominous words Djakarta se acerca (Jakarta is approaching).100
    This is a model destabilization plan — to persuade all concerned that they no longer can hope to be protected by the status quo, and hence weaken the center, while inducing both right and left towards more violent provocation of each other. Such a plan appears to have been followed in Laos in 1959-61, where a CIA officer explained to a reporter that the aim “was to polarize Laos.”101 It appears to have been followed in Indonesia in 1965. Observers like Sundhaussen confirm that to understand the coup story of October 1965 we must look first of all at the “rumour market” which in 1965 … turned out the wildest stories.”102 On September 14, two weeks before the coup, the army was warned that there was a plot to assassinate army leaders four days later; a second such report was discussed at army headquarters on September 30.103 But a year earlier an alleged PKI document, which the PKI denounced as a forgery, had purported to describe a plan to overthrow “Nasutionists” through infiltration of the army. This “document,” which was reported in a Malaysian newspaper after being publicized by the pro-U.S. politician Chaerul Saleh104 in mid-December 1964, must have lent credence to Suharto’s call for an army unity meeting the next month.105
    The army’s anxiety was increased by rumors, throughout 1965, that mainland China was smuggling arms to the PKI for an imminent revolt. Two weeks before Gestapu, a story to this effect also appeared in a Malaysian newspaper, citing Bangkok sources which relied in turn on Hong Kong sources.106 Such international untraceability is the stylistic hallmark of stories emanating in this period from what CIA insiders called their “mighty Wurlitzer,” the world-wide network of press “assets” through which the CIA, or sister agencies such as Britain’s MI-6, could plant unattributable disinformation.107 PKI demands for a popular militia or “fifth force,” and the training of PKI youth at Lubang Buaja, seemed much more sinister to the Indonesian army in the light of the Chinese arms stories.
    But for months before the coup, the paranoia of the PKI had also been played on, by recurring reports that a CIA-backed “Council of Generals” was plotting to suppress the PKI. It was this mythical council, of course, that Untung announced as the target of his allegedly anti-CIA Gestapu coup. But such rumors did not just originate from anti-American sources; on the contrary, the first authoritative published reference to such a council was in a column of the Washington journalists Evans and Novak:
    As far back as March, General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of the Siliwangi Division, had been quoted by two American journalists as saying of the Communists: “we knocked them out before [at Madiun]. We check them and check them again.” The same journalists claimed to have information that “…the Army has quietly established an advisory commission of five general officers to report to General Jani … and General Nasution … on PKI activities.”108
    Mortimer sees the coincidence that five generals besides Yani were killed by Gestapu as possibly significant.
    But we should also be struck by the revival in the United States of the image of Yani and Nasution as anti-PKI planners, long after the CIA and U.S. press stories had in fact written them off as unwilling to act against Sukarno.109 If the elimination by Gestapu of Suharto’s political competitors in the army was to be blamed on the left, then the scenario required just such a revival of the generals’ forgotten anti-Communist image in opposition to Sukarno. An anomalous unsigned August 1965 profile of Nasution in The New York Times, based on an 1963 interview but published only after a verbal attack by Nasution on British bases in Singapore, does just this: it claims (quite incongruously, given the context) that Nasution is “considered the strongest opponent of Communism in Indonesia”; and adds that Sukarno, backed by the PKI, “has been pursuing a campaign to neutralize the … army as an anti-Communist force.”110
    In the same month of August 1965, fear of an imminent showdown between “the PKI and the Nasution group” was fomented in Indonesia by an underground pamphlet; this was distributed by the CIA’s long-time asset, the PSI, whose cadres were by now deeply involved:
    The PKI is combat ready. The Nasution group hope the PKI will be the first to draw the trigger, but this the PKI will not do. The PKI will not allow itself to be provoked as in the Madiun Incident. In the end, however, there will be only two forces left: the PKI and the Nasution group. The middle will have no alternative but to choose and get protection from the stronger force.111
    One could hardly hope to find a better epitome of the propaganda necessary for the CIA’s program of engineering paranoia.
    McGehee’s article, after censorship by the CIA, focuses more narrowly on the CIA’s role in anti-PKI propaganda alone:
    The Agency seized upon this opportunity [Suharto's response to Gestapu] and set out to destroy the P.K.I…. [eight sentences deleted]…. Media fabrications played a key role in stirring up popular resentment against the P.K.I. Photographs of the bodies of the dead generals — badly decomposed — were featured in all the newspapers and on television. Stories accompanying the pictures falsely claimed that the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out by Communist women. This cynically manufactured campaign was designed to foment public anger against the Communists and set the stage for a massacre.112
    McGehee might have added that the propaganda stories of torture by hysterical women with razor blades, which serious scholars dismiss as groundless, were revived in a more sophisticated version by a U.S. journalist, John Hughes, who is now the chief spokesman for the State Department.113
    Suharto’s forces, particularly Col. Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD commandos, were overtly involved in the cynical exploitation of the victims’ bodies.114 But some aspects of the massive propaganda campaign appear to have been orchestrated by non-Indonesians. A case in point is the disputed editorial in support of Gestapu which appeared in the October 2 issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat. Professors Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, who have questioned the authenticity of this issue, have also ruled out the possibility that the newspaper was “an Army falsification,” on the grounds that the army’s “competence … at falsifying party documents has always been abysmally low.”115
    The questions raised by Anderson and McVey have not yet been adequately answered. Why did the PKI show no support for the Gestapu coup while it was in progress, then rashly editorialize in support of Gestapu after it had been crushed? Why did the PKI, whose editorial gave support to Gestapu, fail to mobilize its followers to act on Gestapu’s behalf? Why did Suharto, by then in control of Jakarta, close down all newspapers except this one, and one other left-leaning newspaper which also served his propaganda ends?116 Why, in other words, did Suharto on October 2 allow the publication of only two Jakarta newspapers, two which were on the point of being closed down forever?
    As was stated at the outset, it would be foolish to suggest that in 1965 the only violence came from the U.S. government, the Indonesian military, and their mutual contacts in British and Japanese intelligence. A longer paper could also discuss the provocative actions of the PKI, and of Sukarno himself, in this tragedy of social breakdown. Assuredly, from one point of view, no one was securely in control of events in this troubled period.117
    And yet for two reasons such a fashionably objective summation of events seems inappropriate. In the first place, as the CIA’s own study concedes, we are talking about “one of the ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of current times,” one whose scale of violence seems out of all proportion to such well-publicized left-wing acts as the murder of an army lieutenant at the Bandar Betsy plantation in May 1965,118 And, in the second place, the scenario described by McGehee for 1965 can be seen as not merely responding to the provocations, paranoia, and sheer noise of events in that year, but as actively encouraging and channeling them.
    It should be noted that former CIA Director William Colby has repeatedly denied that there was CIA or other U.S. involvement in the massacre of 1965. (In the absence of a special CIA Task Force, Colby, as head of the CIA’s Far Eastern Division from 1962-66, would normally have been responsible for the CIA’s operations in Indonesia.) Colby’s denial is however linked to the discredited story of a PKI plot to seize political power, a story that he revived in 1978:
    Indonesia exploded, with a bid for power by the largest Communist Party in the world outside the curtain, which killed the leadership of the army with Sukarno’s tacit approval and then was decimated in reprisal. CIA provided a steady flow of reports on the process in Indonesia, although it did not have any role in the course of events themselves.119
    It is important to resolve the issue of U.S. involvement in this systematic murder operation, and particularly to learn more about the CIA account of this which McGehee claims to have seen. McGehee tells us: “The Agency was extremely proud of its successful [one word deleted] and recommended it as a model for future operations [one-half sentence deleted].”120 Ambassador Green reports of an interview with Nixon in 1967:
    The Indonesian experience had been one of particular interest to [Nixon] because things had gone well in Indonesia. I think he was very interested in that whole experience as pointing to the way we [!] should handle our relationships on a wider basis in Southeast Asia generally, and maybe in the world.121
    Such unchallenged assessments help explain the role of Indonesians in the Nixon-sponsored overthrow of Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970, the use of the Jakarta scenario for the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973, and the U.S. sponsorship today of the death squad regimes in Central America.122
    University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A., December 1984

    1. The difficulties of this analysis, based chiefly on the so-called “evidence” presented at the Mahmilub trials, will be obvious to anyone who has tried to reconcile the conflicting accounts of Gestapu in, e.g., the official Suharto account by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, and the somewhat less fanciful CIA study of 1968, both referred to later. I shall draw only on those parts of the Mahmilub evidence which limit or discredit their anti-PKI thesis. For interpretation of the Mahmilub data, cf. especially Coen Holtzappel, “The 30 September Movement,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 216-40. The case for general skepticism is argued by Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 421-3; and more forcefully, by Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda, and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 126-34.
    2. At his long-delayed trial in 1978, Gestapu plotter Latief confirmed earlier revelations that he had visited his old commander Suharto on the eve of the Gestapu kidnappings. He claimed that he raised with Suharto the existence of an alleged right-wing “Council of Generals” plotting to seize power, and informed him “of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the generals’ council for a coup d’etat” (Anon., “The Latief Case: Suharto’s Involvement Revealed,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 248-50). For a more comprehensive view of Suharto’s involvement in Gestapu, cf. especially W.F. Wertheim, “Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 197-215; Holtzappel, “The 30 September,” in contrast, points more particularly to intelligence officers close to the banned Murba party of Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik: cf. fn. 104.
    3. The three phases are: (1) “Gestapu,” the induced left-wing “coup”; (2) “KAP-Gestapu,” or the anti-Gestapu “response,” massacring the PKI; (3) the progressive erosion of Sukarno’s remaining power. This paper will chiefly discuss Gestapu / KAP-Gestapu, the first two phases. To call the first phase by itself a “coup” is in my view an abuse of terminology: there is no real evidence that in this phase political power changed hands or that this was the intention.
    4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia — The Coup that Backfired, 1968 (cited hereafter as CIA Study), p. 71n.
    5. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 79-81.
    6. In addition, one of the two Gestapu victims in Central Java (Colonel Katamso) was the only non-PKI official of rank to attend the PKI’s nineteenth anniversary celebration in Jogjakarta in May 1964: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 432. Ironically, the belated “discovery” of his corpse was used to trigger off the purge of his PKI contacts.
    7. Four of the six pro-Yani representatives in January were killed along with Yani on October 1. Of the five anti-Yani representatives in January, we shall see that at least three were prominent in “putting down” Gestapu and completing the elimination of the Yani-Sukarno loyalists (the three were Suharto, Basuki Rachmat, and Sudirman of SESKOAD, the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School): Crouch, The Army, p. 81n.
    8. While Nasution’s daughter and aide were murdered, he was able to escape without serious injury, and support the ensuing purge.
    9. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 165 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961 from Richard M. Bissell, Attachment B). By 1965 this disillusionment was heightened by Nasution’s deep opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
    10. Crouch, The Army, p. 40; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 221-2.
    11. I shall assume for this condensed argument that Untung was the author, or at least approved, of the statements issued in his name. Scholars who see Untung as a dupe of Gestapu’s controllers note that Untung was nowhere near the radio station broadcasting in his name, and that he appears to have had little or no influence over the task force which occupied it (under Captain Suradi of the intelligence service of Colonel Latief’s Brigade): Holtzappel, pp. 218, 231-2, 236-7. I have no reason to contradict those careful analysts of Gestapu — such as Wertheim, “Whose Plot?” p. 212, and Holtzappel, “The 30 September,” p. 231 — who conclude that Untung personally was sincere, and manipulated by other dalangs such as Sjam.
    12. Broadcast of 7:15 a.m. October 1; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), p. 134; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 196.
    13. Ibid., p. 201.
    14. Broadcasts of October 1 and 4, 1965; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), pp. 158-9.
    15. CIA Study, p. 2; O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970), p. 12, quoting Suharto himself: “On my way to KOSTRAD HQ [Suharto's HQ] I passed soldiers in green berets who were placed under KOSTRAD command but who did not salute me.”
    16. Anderson and McVey concluded that Sukarno, Air Force Chief Omar Dhani, PKI Chairman Aidit (the three principal political targets of Suharto’s anti-Gestapu “response”) were rounded up by the Gestapu plotters in the middle of the night, and taken to Halim air force base, about one mile from the well at Lubang Buaja where the generals’ corpses were discovered. In 1966 they surmised that this was “to seal the conspirators’ control of the bases,” and to persuade Sukarno “to go along with” the conspirators’ plans (Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 19-21). An alternative hypothesis of course is that Gestapu, by bringing these men together against their will, created the semblance of a PKI-air force-Sukarno conspiracy which would later be exploited by Suharto. Sukarno’s presence at Halim “was later to provide Sukarno’s critics with some of their handiest ammunition” (John Hughes, The End of Sukarno [London: Angus and Robertson, 1978], p. 54).
    17. CIA Study, p. 2; cf. p. 65: “At the height of the coup … the troops of the rebels [in Central Java] were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during the next two days, these forces gradually melted away.”
    18. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1966 (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978), vol. II, p. 172. These battalions, comprising the bulk of the 3rd Paratroop Brigade, also supplied the bulk of the troops used to put down Gestapu in Jakarta. The subordination of these two factions in this supposed civil war to a single close command structure under Suharto is cited to explain how Suharto was able to restore order in the city without gunfire. Meanwhile out at the Halim air force base an alleged gun battle between the 454th (Green Beret) and RPKAD (Red Beret) paratroops went off “without the loss of a single man” (CIA Study, p. 60). In Central Java, also, power “changed hands silently and peacefully,” with “an astonishing lack of violence” (CIA Study, p. 66).
    19. Ibid., p. 60n; Arthur J. Dommen, “The Attempted Coup in Indonesia,” China Quarterly, January-March 1966, p. 147. The first “get-acquainted” meeting of the Gestapu plotters is placed in the Indonesian chronology of events from “sometimes before August 17, 1965″; cf. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the “September 30 Movement” in Indonesia (Jakarta: [Pembimbing Masa, 1968], p. 13); in the CIA Study, this meeting is dated September 6 (p. 112). Neither account allows more than a few weeks to plot a coup in the world’s fifth most populous country.
    20. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 429.
    21. Of the six General Staff officers appointed along with Yani, three (Suprapto, D.I. Pandjaitan, and S. Parman) were murdered. Of the three survivors, two (Mursjid and Pranoto) were removed by Suharto in the next eight months. The last member of Yani’s staff, Djamin Gintings, was used by Suharto during the establishment of the New Order, and ignored thereafter.
    22. Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), p. 391; cf. Arnold Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 118-9.
    23. Crouch, The Army, p. 150n.
    24. Ibid., pp. 140-53; for the disputed case of Bali, even Robert Shaplen, a journalist close to U.S. official sources, concedes that “The Army began it” (Time Out of Hand [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], p. 125). The slaughter in East Java “also really got started when the RPKAD arrived, not just Central Java and Bali” (letter from Benedict Anderson).
    25. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 171, 178-9, 210, 228; Donald Hindley, “Alirans and the Fall of the Older Order,” Indonesia, 25 (April 1970), pp. 40-41.
    26. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 219.
    27. “In 1965 it [the BND, or intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany] assisted Indonesia’s military secret service to suppress a left-wing Putsch in Djakarta, delivering sub-machine guns, radio equipment and money to the value of 300,000 marks” (Heinz Hoehne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was a Spy [New York: Bantam, 1972], p. xxxiii).
    28. We should not be misled by the CIA’s support of the 1958 rebellion into assuming that all U.S. Government plotting against Sukarno and the PKI must have been CIA-based (cf. fn. 122).
    29. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University press, 1966), p. 12. For John Foster Dulles’ hostility to Indonesian unity in 1953, cf. Leonard Mosley, Dulles (New York: The Dial Press / James Wade, 1978), p. 437.
    30. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publications, 1982), 001191.
    31. As the head of the PKI’s secret Special Bureau, responsible only to Aidit, Sjam by his own testimony provided leadership to the “progressive officers” of Gestapu. The issue of PKI involvement in Gestapu thus rests on the question of whether Sjam was manipulating the Gestapu leadership on behalf of the PKI, or the PKI leadership on behalf of the army. There seems to be no disagreement that Sjam was (according to the CIA Study, p. 107) a longtime “double agent” and professed “informer for the Djakarta Military Command.” Wertheim (p. 203) notes that in the 1950s Sjam “was a cadre of the PSI,” and “had also been in touch with Lt. Col. Suharto, today’s President, who often came to stay in his house in Jogja.” This might help explain why in the 1970s, after having been sentenced to death, Sjam and his co-conspirator Supeno were reportedly “allowed out [of prison] from time to time and wrote reports for the army on the political situation” (May, The Indonesian, p. 114). Additionally, the “Sjam” who actually testified and was convicted, after being “captured” on March 9, 1967, was the third individual to be identified by the army as the “Sjam” of whom Untung had spoken: Declassified Documents Retrospective Collection (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, 1976), 613C; Hughes, p. 25.
    32. Wertheim, “Whose Plot?” p. 203; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 431 (Sjam); Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 228 (Suwarto and Sarwo Edhie).
    33. Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam, 1976), p. 205; cf. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 89.
    34. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,” 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975 (Senate Report No. 94-465), p. 4n; personal communications.
    35. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 002386; 1981, 367A.
    36. Ibid., 1982, 002386 (JCS Memo for SecDef, 22 September 1958).
    37. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 164 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961, Attachment A, p. 6).
    38. Scholars are divided over interpretations of Madiun as they are over Gestapu. Few Americans have endorsed the conclusion of Wertheim that “the so-called communist revolt of Madiun … was probably more or less provoked by anti-communist elements”; yet Kahin has suggested that the events leading to Madiun “may have been symptomatic of a general and widespread government drive aimed at cutting down the military strength of the PKI” (W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition [The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1956], p. 82; George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970], p. 288). Cf. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 26-30.
    39. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 68; cf. Nasution’s statement to students on November 12, 1965, reprinted in Indonesia, 1 (April 1966), p. 183: “We are obliged and dutybound to wipe them [the PKI] from the soil of Indonesia.”
    40. Examples in Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting Military-Economic Development,” in Malcolm Caldwell, ed., Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1975), pp. 227-32.
    41. David Ransom, “Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia,” in Steve Weissman, ed., The Trojan Horse (San Francisco, California: Ramparts Press, 1974), p. 97; cf. p. 101. Pauker brought Suwarto to RAND in 1962.
    42. John H. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 222-4. The foreword to the book is by Klaus Knorr, who worked for the CIA while teaching at Princeton.
    43. Shaplen, Time, p. 118; Hughes, The End, p. 119; Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 75-6; Scott, “Exporting,” p. 231. William Kintner, a CIA (OPC) senior staff officer from 1950-52, and later Nixon’s ambassador to Thailand, also wrote in favor of “liquidating” the PKI while working at a CIA-subsidized think-tank, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the University of Pennsylvania campus (William Kintner and Joseph Kornfeder, The New Frontier of War [London: Frederick Muller, 1963], pp. 233, 237-8): “If the PKI is able to maintain its legal existence and Soviet influence continues to grow, it is possible that Indonesia may be the first Southeast Asia country to be taken over by a popularly based, legally elected communist government…. In the meantime, with Western help, free Asian political leaders — together with the military — must not only hold on and manage, but reform and advance while liquidating the enemy’s political and guerrilla armies.”
    44. Ransom, “Ford Country,” pp. 95-103; Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 34-6; Scott, “Exporting,” pp. 227-35.
    45. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 141, 175.
    46. Published U.S. accounts of the Civic Mission / “civic action” programs describe them as devoted to “civic projects — rehabilitating canals, draining swampland to create new rice paddies, building bridges and roads, and so on (Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation [Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967], p. 377). But a memo to President Johnson from Secretary of State Rusk, on July 17, 1964, makes it clear that at that time the chief importance of MILTAG was for its contact with anti-Communist elements in the Indonesian Army and its Territorial Organization: “Our aid to Indonesia … we are satisfied … is not helping Indonesia militarily. It is however, permitting us to maintain some contact with key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable of resisting Communist takeover. We think this is of vital importance to the entire Free World” (Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 001786 [DOS Memo for President of July 17, 1964; italics in original]).
    47. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 35; Scott, “Exporting,” p. 233.
    48. Ransom, “Ford Country,” pp. 101-2, quoting Willis G. Ethel; cited in Scott, “Exporting,” p. 235.
    49. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 141. There was also the army’s “own securely controlled paramilitary organization of students — modelled on the U.S.R.O.T.C. and commanded by an army colonel [Djuhartono] fresh from the U.S. army intelligence course in Hawaii”: Mrazek, The United States, vol. II, p. 139, citing interview of Nasution with George Kahin, July 8, 1963.
    50. Pauker, though modest in assessing his own political influence, does claim that a RAND paper he wrote on counterinsurgency and social justice, ignored by the U.S. military for whom it was intended, was influential in the development of his friend Suwarto’s Civic Mission doctrine.
    51. Noam Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1979), p. 206; David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 178.
    52. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 178-9. The PSI of course was neither monolithic nor a simple instrument of U.S. policy. But the real point is that, in this 1963 incident as in others

  28. Hebat hato beliau

  29. wah bagus nie tuk mengenang kembali orang paling no 1 di Indonesia

  30. tak akan ku lupakan jasa2 Bung Karno
    tidak ada pemimpin seperti Bung Karno yg benari dan tegas walau mase banyak yg mendukungnya, hanya demi rakyat INDONESIA. rela tdk melakukan apa2

  31. Sesuatu yang kurang diketahui oleh khalayak Indonesia: sayangnya: Bung Karno itu bukan hanya Insinyur pribumi pertama tamatan Technische Hogeschool Bandung jaman Blanda dulu tapi juga satu2nya kepala negara didunia yang oleh Technische Universität Berlin (West) sampai waktu itu pernah mendapat gelar kehormatan Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing. e.h. atau Dr.-Ing. hc), yaitu dibulan Juni 1956. Berlin-Barat waktu itu daerah pendudukan Amerika, Inggris dan Prancis yang terletak ditengah-tengah daerah Jerman-Timur yang dikuasai Uni Sovyet.
    Saya sesalkan sekali, bahwa fakta yang patut kita banggakan ini dikalangan perwakilan negeri kita sendiri di Jerman pun tak dikenal. Saya memiliki 14 foto yang saya peroleh dari arsip TU Berlin yang tahun lalu kemudian kuberikan pada Attase Kebudayaan KBRI di Berlin.

  32. Komentar oleh R.N.Soetarjono on Desember 23, 2011 6:04 am

    Sesuatu yang kurang diketahui oleh khalayak Indonesia, sayangnya: Bung Karno itu bukan hanya Insinyur pribumi pertama tamatan Technische Hogeschool Bandung jaman Blanda dulu tapi juga satu2nya kepala negara didunia yang oleh Technische Universität Berlin (West) sampai waktu itu pernah mendapat gelar kehormatan Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing. e.h. atau Dr.-Ing. hc), yaitu dibulan Juni 1956. Berlin-Barat waktu itu daerah pendudukan Amerika, Inggris dan Prancis yang terletak ditengah-tengah daerah Jerman-Timur yang dikuasai Uni Sovyet.
    Saya sesalkan sekali, bahwa fakta yang patut kita banggakan ini dikalangan perwakilan negeri kita sendiri di Jerman pun tak dikenal. Saya memiliki 14 foto yang saya peroleh dari arsip TU Berlin yang tahun lalu kemudian kuberikan pada Attase Kebudayaan KBRI di Berlin.

  33. Good reality to be exposed..

  34. @Titus joko s : Semoga cukup banyak pembaca yang faham bahasa inggris dan sabar membaca studi analisa Peter Dale Scott diatas yang sangat bermutu untuk sejarah kita dan patut dimaklumi oleh penerus dan pelurus generasi kita.

  35. Saya bangga jadi Bangsa Indonesia, Bangsa yang Besar, Bangga punya Presiden seperti Bung Karno…..semoga cita-cita dan impian Bapak menjadikan Indonesia negara NKRI sebagai negara MERCUSUAR DUNIA menjadi kenyataan.salam

  36. kita bisa menilai presiden yang dihormati rakyatnya bisa dilihat pada jumlah yang berziarah ke makamnya.,
    analogi tdk mendasar tp kenyataaan., makam soekarno atau suharto ?? jawab sendiri., terima kasih pak soekarno, kami menantikan pemimpin sepertimu di negeri yang amburadul ini.,

  37. @aji>>> “kita bisa menilai presiden yang dihormati rakyatnya bisa dilihat pada jumlah yang berziarah ke makamnya., makam soekarno atau suharto ??”. Maaf bung, aku nggak bisa menjawabnya karena itu ingin tahu bagaimana jawaban anda sendiri??? Andaikata lebih banyak jumlah yang berziarah kemakam Suharto, itupun bukan bukti, karena mungkin banyak penziarah yang berpakaian seragam dan kroni2nya kan masih besar dan kuat jaringannya.

  38. soekarno mengapa jiwa-mu tak hidup pada generasi setelah-mu.
    salam rindu untuk mu dan jiwa mu dari generasi mu yg hilang

  39. Karena yang menamakan dirinya pemimpin atau elit politik bangsamu sudah lupa daratan, tak mengenal rakyat dan hanya mementingkan diri sendiri sehingga mudah dibeli kekuatan asing dan gampang disuap dan diadu-dombakan. Para pemuda dan penerus bangsa sebetulnya harus menginsyafi ini dan bertindak semestinya.

  40. konon katanya bung karno masih hidup… kenapa tidak dicari?

  41. sebetulnya bung karno juga sudah tahu, kalo wahyu keprabon indonesia raya sudah bukan milikya lagi, sudah harus berpindah ke tangan orang lain, demikian juga saat pak harto mau lengser juga begitu… wahyu keprabon sudah bukan milikya lagi…jadi tak ada gunanya bila misalnya harus memaksakan diri untuk dipertahankan…
    sejarah jawa sudah pernah mencatat saat sultan hadiwijoyo (joko tingkir) mengalami hal itu… e bukannya mengalah malah mempertahankan kekuasaan akhirnya ya tetep KO, demikian bung karno juga pak harto di saat akhir kekuasaannya

    mohon direnungkan,
    salam perjuangan!

  42. @sigundul waduhh sejarah itu science bukan klenik bung, “wahyu keprabon” or whatever kagak dikenal tuh dalam premis sejarah…kudeta 1965 adalah fakta karena yg berkuasa selama 32 taon ya suharto dan kliknya,kok masih aja ada yg ngeles kanan kiri untuk tidak mengakuinya? so i suggest just deal with it…….

  43. Indonesia sepertinya jadi incaran ideologi Imperialis kuno,dg ambisi gold,glory,gospel,sayangnya hanya bungkarno presiden yg sadar akan hal ini?dan diungkap di salah satu pidatonya?politik beliau jadi terfokus kekuatan luar negeri,bahkan sepertinya tahu siapa pengincar emas di alam ini?konyolnya atau hebatnya,nggak gentar,dibuat kekuatan tandingan NEFO?andai bungkarno tidak disungkurkan NEFO mungkin dimasa ini akan jadi musuh NATO?ini yg amerika nggak mau?kata si”glory”tidak boleh ada kekuatan diatas kita.

  44. sepertinya yg terjadi di Indonesia th 1965,bkn kudeta,tapi pembersihan faham komunis?negara manakah yg punya impian ini?konon amerika?ada pertanyaan lain lebih penting daripada “siapa dalang G30S?yaitu”kenapa komunisme harus dibubarkan?”apkh krn mengancam kepentingan amerika demi menguasai kekayaan alam Indonesia?khususnya,emas.ambisi imperialisme,gold,glory,gospel.emas itu ada disini, diincar kaum imperialis sejak jaman majapahit.gara gara informasi dari biarawan roma yg melihat istana jawa dipenuhi emas?

  45. globalisasi sepertinya akal akalan kaum imperialis,yg karena malu menjajah terang terangan,digundulinya bulu landak kolonialis,dan menggantinya dg liberalis.ayo donk boleh donk masuk negaramu,dan jadi tuan tanah dikampungmu?lantas ditandatanganilah kontrak kerjasama dg negara asing berisi kesepakatan eksplorasi sumber alam berbahasa luar angkasa.yg hanya akan dianggap adil oleh demit alien.

  46. pada jaman dahulu,hampir semua bangsa di dunia ini berlomba lomba memperluas wilayah jajahan atau jarahan,mungkin kaum imperialis terinspirasi oleh monyet,bahwa dimana ada pohon rambutan berbuah lebat maka kesanalah mereka menyerbu?ideologi monyetisme inilah yg ditentang habis habisan oleh Sukarno,yg dg tegas berkata,bahwa penjajahan diatas dunia ini harus dihapuskan?gatel jidat imperialis,dg ambisi 3G,mikir bagaimana mengeruk emas Indonesia jika Sukarno tidak dijatuhkan dari kursi kepemimpinan Indonesia?

  47. Ketulusan dan kebesaran hatimu dapat meluluhkan kerasnya batu karang,.kau tetap hidup dalam sanubariku ajaran mu yang sulit ditandingi oleh negara manapun..di bumi ini. aku akan berdiri disampingmu. Garuda di dadaku,PANCASILA peganganku….Indonesia Bumiku……….Hiduplah Indonesia Raya.

  48. saya bangga sebagai bangsa indonesia yg punya pemimpin yg nasionalis, hemat saya ada dua pemimpin indonesia yg nasionalis sejati yaitu soekarno dan gus dur.karena biasanya pemimpin yg dicintai rakyatnya akan tidak disukai pemilik modal. lihatlah setelah kematiannya siapa yg banyak di kunjungi rakyatnya.suharto atau soekarno….
    ….

  49. sebagai generasi muda sangat rindu akan sikap kenegarawanan Bung Karno, disaat bangsa krisis kepemimpinan. Kami tak akan mem-banding2kan Presiden Republik ini setelah era Bung Karno, karena memang tidak bisa dibandingkan. Sejarah tidak akan pernah berbohong, walaupun pernah dan akan selalu dimanipulasi. Sukarno memang telah tiada, tp jiwa dan pemikirannya akan selalu hidup untuk menginspirasi bangsa ini.

  50. Reblogged this on kaisardwipramudianto.

  51. memang Soekarno adalah pemimpin sejati yg tak akan dan pernah di temukan lg sesudahnya,salam hormat…

  52. soekarno is the best

  53. Soekarno aku bangga padamu

  54. Sukarno pemimpin yang hebat, hidupnya hanya untuk negeri ini, tidak memperkaya diri. Soeharto hanya memperkaya diri dan kroninya. Menyiksa Bung Karno sampai meninggal. Jendreral tidak tahu diri.

  55. Soeharto tidak pantas menyandang gelar pahlawan, karena:
    1. Manipulasi sejarah tentang G30S. Mestinya sebagai Pangkostrad bisa mencegah tragedi itu, karena dia tahu rencana itu sebelumnya.
    2. Memanipulasi Supersemar.
    3. Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949.
    4. Penyelundup saat jadi Pangdam Diponegoro.
    5. Koruptor kelas wahid.

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